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Abstract 
 In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose 
increasing returns technologies to maximize profits.  Capital and labor are the two factors of 
production.  The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment.  The model can explain 
some interesting observations of the labor market.  First, even though there is neither long-term 
labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an 
increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, 
and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate.  Second, 
the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock.  Third, a higher level of capital 
stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate.  That is, there is no monotonic 
relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate. 
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1. Introduction 
There are some interesting observations of the labor market.  First, industries with higher 
capital intensities are associated with higher wage rates, as discussed in Dickens and Katz (1987) 
and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).  Second, there is no long-term relationship between 
capital accumulation and the unemployment rate, as discussed in Romer (2006, chap. 9).  Third, 
there is likely existence of wage rigidity, as discussed in Gottschalk (2005), Dickens et al. (2007), 
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2013).  As stated in Romer (2006, chap. 9), there is no study 
explaining the above three features of the labor market in a unified formal model. 
In this paper, we provide explanations to the above three observations on the labor market 
in a simple general equilibrium model.  We show that wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon 
even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment.  Following 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a worker chooses whether to exert effort or shirk.  If a worker is 
detected shirking, this worker will be fired.  A worker also faces an exogenous rate of separation 
from his job.  To deter shirking, the wage rate is higher than the market clearing wage rate and 
unemployment results.  Firms engage in Cournot competition.  In addition to choosing output, a 
firm chooses from a continuum of technologies to maximize its profit.  For each technology, capital 
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is the fixed cost and labor is the marginal cost of production.  A more advanced technology has a 
higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production.  The existence of fixed costs leads to 
increasing returns in production.   
First, we show that an increase in capital leads firms to choose more advanced technologies 
and the equilibrium wage rate increases.  This result is consistent with empirical evidence that 
industries with higher capital-labor ratios pay higher wage rates. 
Second, we show that an increase in capital does not necessarily reduce the unemployment 
rate.  The reason is as follows.  When the amount of capital increases, there are two effects affecting 
the unemployment rate working in opposite directions.  On the one hand, a more advanced 
technology uses a lower amount of labor to produce each unit of output.  This tends to decrease 
the demand for labor.  On the other hand, an increase in capital increases total output.  This latter 
effect tends to increase the demand for labor.  Overall an increase in capital does not necessarily 
increase the total demand for labor and the impact on the unemployment rate is ambiguous.  This 
result is consistent with the observation that there is no long run relationship between capital 
accumulation and the unemployment rate in macroeconomics.  This result is also consistent with 
the criticism of the Lewis model that capital accumulation may not be the same as job creation in 
economic development (Todaro and Smith, 2012, p. 118). 
Third, while the wage rate is not exogenously given, wage rigidity is an equilibrium 
phenomenon in this model: the equilibrium wage rate changes neither with an increase in the 
exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, nor with the 
probability that shirking is detected.  To understand this kind of wage rigidity, in this model the 
equilibrium technology depends on the amount of capital only.  The reason is as follows.  From 
the equilibrium condition determining a firm’s optimal choice of technology, a firm’s technology 
is affected by the wage rate, the interest rate, and its level of output.  However, the wage rate, the 
interest rate, and the level of output are endogenously determined in this model.  The impact from 
an increase in the interest rate is cancelled out by that from an increase in output.  The remaining 
variable affecting the equilibrium technology of a firm is the wage rate, which is affected by the 
amount of capital.  Thus, the equilibrium technology is affected by the amount of capital only.  
Since the equilibrium technology changes neither with the size of the population, the cost of effort, 
nor the probability that shirking is detected, the equilibrium wage rate does not change with any 
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of these factors.  Thus, in a business cycle if some factors such as the cost of effort change, the 
wage rate may not change.   
Why unemployment exists is a complicated issue.  There are many interesting and valuable 
models of unemployment, such as the search models and the efficiency wage models.  Wage 
stickiness can be generated in search models such as in Hall (2005) and Rudanko (2011).  This 
paper is directly related to the literature on unemployment as a result of the existence of efficiency 
wages as studied in the stimulating paper of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  The Shapiro-Stiglitz 
model has been extended and generalized in various directions.  For example, the out of steady 
state dynamics is explored in Kimball (1994) and productivity shock is studied in Fella (2000).  
The Shapiro-Stiglitz model has also been used as a vehicle to address the hotly debated issue of 
the impact of international trade on unemployment: in Matusz (1996), firms engage in 
monopolistic competition; in Hoon (2001), out of steady state dynamics is an essential part of his 
analysis; in Davis and Harrigan (2011), firm heterogeneity is introduced through differences in 
monitoring intensities of firms.  The choice of technology by firms is not addressed in the above 
models. 
In terms of the choice of technologies, this paper is related to Zhou (2004, 2009, 2013).  
Zhou (2004) studies the mutual dependence between the division of labor and the extent of the 
market in a general equilibrium model.  Zhou (2009) addresses the impact of population growth 
on an economy’s possibility of achieving industrialization.  One difference between this paper and 
Zhou (2004, 2009) is that there is no unemployment in Zhou (2004, 2009) while in this model 
there is unemployment in equilibrium.  Zhou (2013) explores the choice of technology in a two-
sector model of economic development in which urban unemployment exists.  One difference 
between this paper and Zhou (2013) is that the wage rate is exogenously given in Zhou (2013) 
while in this model the wage rate is endogenously determined. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 specifies the model by studying a consumer’s 
behavior, a firm’s behavior, and market clearing conditions.  Section 3 establishes the existence of 
a unique steady state and conducts comparative statics to explore the properties of the steady state.  
Section 4 concludes.  By specifying marginal and fixed costs, the Appendix provides closed form 
solutions to equilibrium variables. 
 
2. Model specification  
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In this model, time is continuous.  If there is no confusion, we do not index variables with 
time periods.  Capital and labor are the two factors of production.  Capital does not depreciate and 
the amount of exogenously given capital is K .  Capital is owned equally by all individuals.  The 
interest rate is r , which will be determined endogenously.  Individuals live forever.  The size of 
the population is L  and does not change over time.   
In the following, first we study a consumer’s utility optimization, then we study a firm’s 
profit maximization, finally we establish market clearing conditions, such as markets for capital 
and the consumption good. 
 
2.1. Consumer behavior 
Individuals are risk neutral.  Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor.  The wage 
rate is w  and the unemployment rate is u .  For an individual, the per capita income from 
ownership of capital is  .  An individual’s total expected income is I , which is the sum of income 
from owning capital and expected wage income: 
     wuI )1( .            (1) 
This individual’s level of consumption is c .  The cost of effort for a worker if this worker 
does not shirk is e .  The price of the consumption good is p .  A consumer’s utility function is 
specified as (whether the time preference is equal to interest rate does not affect main results) 
     dtetu rt

 )(0 .    
     es
p
Itu )( .             (2) 
 In the above specification, }1,0{s .  If a worker shirks, then 0s  and no cost of effort is 
incurred by this worker; if a worker does not shirk, then 1s  and the cost of effort is incurred by 
the worker.  A consumer’s budget constraint states that  
     Icp  .             
If a worker shirks, the probability that shirking is detected is q .  Once detected shirking, 
this worker will be fired.  In addition to being fired, the exogenous job separation rate is b .  The 
expected lifetime utility of an employed shirker is SEV  and the expected lifetime utility of an 
unemployed individual is uV .  At any point in time, an individual is either employed or 
unemployed.  When an individual is employed, this individual’s income is the sum of the wage 
 5 
 
income and the revenue from owning capital.  Similar to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), for a shirker, 
the asset equation is given by 
     ))(()( SEuSE VVqbwUrV   . 
The above equation states that a shirker enjoys instant utility of )( wU , the possibility 
of job separation at each moment is qb   and thus a change of asset value of SEu VV   .  
Rearrangement of this equation leads to 
     
qbr
VqbwUV uSE 
 )()(  .           (3) 
 The expected lifetime utility of an employed nonshirker is NEV .  For a nonshirker, the 
possibility of job separation at each moment is b , which is smaller than the possibility of job 
separation for a shirker qb  .  However, a nonshirker incurs a disutility from working.  The asset 
equation for a nonshirker is given by 
     )()( NEuNE VVbewUrV   . 
 Rearrangement of this equation leads to 
     
br
bVewUV uNE 
 )(  .           (4) 
 A worker will choose not to shirk if the value from nonshirking is not smaller than that 
from shirking: SENE VV  .  From equations (3) and (4), the no-shirking condition is 
     
q
eqbrrVwU u
)()(  .          (5) 
The level of unemployment benefit is w .  When an individual becomes unemployed, this 
individual still gets income from owning capital.  The instant rate for an unemployed individual to 
find a job is a .  The asset equation for an unemployed individual is  
     )()( uEu VVawUrV   .           (6) 
 From equations (4) and (6), we have 
     
rba
ubrewuarVu 
 )()(])([  .          (7) 
 
2.2. Firm behavior 
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The consumption good is produced by m  identical firms.1  Firms engage in Cournot 
competition.2  To produce the consumption good, similar to Zhou (2004, 2009, 2013), we assume 
that a firm may choose from a continuum of technologies indexed by a positive number n .  A 
higher value of n  indicates a more advanced technology.  For each technology, capital is specified 
as the fixed cost and labor is specified as the marginal cost of production.  Different technologies 
have different levels of fixed and marginal costs.  The level of fixed cost in terms of the amount 
of capital used associated with technology n  is )(nf  and the level of marginal cost in terms of 
the amount of labor used is )(n .  To capture the substitution between capital and labor in 
production, we assume that a more advanced technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower 
marginal cost of production: 0)(' nf  and 0)(' n . 
The motivation behind the above assumption on technologies is as follows.  In reality, there 
are various examples that technologies exhibit increasing returns and firms choose technologies 
with different levels of marginal and fixed costs.  First, Porter (1990, p. 97) discusses choices of 
printers.  There are three types of printers and the most expensive one (with a price tag of dozens 
of millions dollars) is the fastest and is suitable for large volume printing such as printing 
newspapers.  The costs of purchasing printers are fixed costs and the existence of fixed costs leads 
to increasing returns.  An increase in fixed costs leads to a decrease in marginal costs of printing.  
Second, Prendergast (1990) discusses the tradeoff between fixed and marginal costs in three 
industries: nuts and bolts, iron founding, and machine tools.  In those industries, technologies with 
higher fixed costs have lower marginal costs of production.  Prendergast shows that a firm’s choice 
of technology is affected by its level of output: a higher level of output is associated with the usage 
of technologies with higher fixed costs of production.  Third, Levinson (2006) discusses the 
adoption of containers and the choice of technology in the transportation sector.  The adoption of 
containers was one of the most important innovations in the transportation sector in the twentieth 
century.  Containers were introduced into the transportation sector in the 1950s.  At that time, the 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, the number of firms is a real number rather than restricted to be an integer number. 
2 Oligopolistic competition is an important type of market structure for a modern society.  Chandler (1990) discusses 
the rise of oligopoly in the United States.  Modern production is associated with the extensive use of machines, which 
are fixed costs of production.  With the existence of significant fixed costs, a firm with a higher level of output has a 
cost advantage over a firm with a lower level of output.  Increasing returns in production, distribution, and management 
led to the formation of large firms in many important industries, such as the steel industry.  With antitrust laws 
preventing monopolies from happening, those industries began dominated by small numbers of firms engaging in 
oligopolistic competition. 
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loading and unloading of cargos were handled by longshoremen and were labor intensive.  With 
high wage rates, marginal costs were high.  Because specially designed cranes, containerships, and 
container ports had to be built, the adoption of containers led to sharp rises in fixed costs of 
production.  However, marginal costs of loading and unloading decreased sharply.   
For a firm with output level x , its revenue is xp .  This firm’s costs of capital are rnf )( , 
costs of labor are wxn)( , thus its profit is wxnrnfxp )()(  .  A firm chooses output and 
technology optimally to maximize its profit.  First, a firm’s optimal choice of output leads to 
0

 w
x
pxp  .  With the specification of the utility function in (2), the absolute value of a 
consumer’s elasticity of demand for the consumption good is one.  Plugging this result into a firm’s 
optimal choice of output leads to the following familiar equation stating that marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost: 
     w
m
p 



  11 .            (8) 
 Second, the first order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of technology requires that 
     0)(')('  wxnrnf  .           (9) 
 The second order condition for the optimal choice of technology requires that 
0)('')(''  wxnrnf  .  We assume that 0'' f  and 0'' .  That is, when more advanced 
technologies are adopted, fixed costs increase at a nondecreasing rate and marginal costs decrease 
at a nonincreasing rate.  The restriction 0'' f  and 0''  is sufficient for the second order 
condition to be satisfied. 
 The choice of technology can lead to firm heterogeneity among countries.  Suppose two 
countries differ in their endowments of capital.  Even though firms may have access to the same 
set of technologies, firms in the country with a higher endowment of capital will choose more 
advanced technologies and workers will have higher wage rates (shown later in Proposition 1 for 
different industries in a given country).  This can lead to correlations among the choice of 
technology, capital stock, and general macroeconomic conditions.3  For example, if a country 
experiences capital inflow, we may expect that firms will choose more advanced technologies and 
the wage rate will increase. 
                                                 
3 I thank a referee for this suggestion that the choice of technology may lead to firm heterogeneity. 
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2.3. Market clearing conditions 
 Similar to the argument in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a firm will set the unemployment 
benefit to zero.  Plugging equation (7) into (5), for a worker not to shirk, the wage rate needs to 
satisfy the following condition: 
    
q
eqbr
rba
ubrewuawu )()()(])([)( 

  . 
In equilibrium, the above relationship will hold with equality.  With the utility function 
specified in equation (2), from the above expression, the wage rate is defined by 
     


 

 r
xmL
Lb
q
eewu

)( .         (10) 
For the market for labor, each firm demands x  units of labor and total demand for labor 
from m  firms is xm  .  In equilibrium, all the employed individuals do not shirk.  Each individual 
supplies one unit of labor and total effective supply of labor in this economy is Lu)1(  .  
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that 
     Luxm )1(  .          (11) 
 For the market for capital, each firm demands f  units of capital and total demand for 
capital from m  firms is fm .  Total supply of capital is K .  The clearance of the market for capital 
requires that 
     Kfm  .           (12) 
 For the market for the consumption good, total demand from all individuals is pLI /  (since 
preferences are homothetic, the distribution of income will not affect the total demand for the 
consumption good).  Total supply of the consumption good from all firms is xm .  The clearance 
of the market for the consumption good requires that 
     
p
LI
xm .           (13) 
Since the number of firms is a real number rather than restricted to be an integer number, 
firms will enter until the level of profit is zero.4  Zero profit for a firm requires that 
                                                 
4 For examples of Cournot competition with zero profits for firms, see Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Sections 3.7 
and 4.5 of Brander (1995), and Zhang (2007). 
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     0 wxrfxp  .          (14) 
In equilibrium, the total amount of revenue received by individuals as owners of capital 
L  should be equal to the return to capital Kr : 
     LKr  .           (15) 
In a steady state, equations (1) and (8)-(15) form a system of 9 equations defining a system 
of 9 variables p , r , x , m , I , n , w ,  , and u  as functions of exogenous parameters.  A steady 
state is a tuple ( p , r , x , m , I , n , w ,  , u ) satisfying equations (1) and (8)-(15).5  For the rest 
of the paper, the consumption good is used as the numeraire:  
1p . 
With the price of the consumption good normalized to one, equation (10) simplifies to 
     


 

 r
xmL
Lb
q
eew

.         (16) 
 
3. Comparative statics 
From equations (1) and (8)-(15), we can derive the following system of three equations 
defining three endogenous variables u , r , and n  as functions of exogenous parameters:6 
   0111 


 



  r
u
b
q
ee
K
fV

,         (17) 
   0)(''2  fKfV  ,          (18) 
   0)1( 23  KrLfuV  .          (19) 
Partial differentiation of the system of equations (17)-(19) with respect to u , r , n , K , b
, L , e , and q  leads to7 
                                                 
5 For this system of equations, when equations (1), (8)-(12), (14), and (15) are satisfied, equation (13) is automatically 
satisfied.  That is, one equation is redundant.  With Walras’s law in mind, this redundancy is not surprising. 
6 Equations (17)-(19) are derived as follows.  First, equation (17) is derived by plugging the value of m  from equation 
(12) into equation (8), then plugging the resulting value of w  into equation (16).  Second, equation (18) is derived by 
plugging the value of x  from equation (14) into equation (9).  Third, equation (19) is derived by plugging the value 
of m  from equation (12), the value of x  from equation (14), and the value of w1  from equations (8) and (12) 
into equation (11). 
7 Equation (18) is used to show that 0/1  nV . 
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  dK
K
V
K
V
K
V
dn
dr
du
n
V
r
V
u
V
n
V
r
V
u
V

































































3
2
1
333
2
11
00
0
db
b
V

















0
0
1
 
dL
L
V

















3
0
0
de
e
V

















0
0
1
dq
q
V



















0
0
1
.       (20) 
Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of the 
system (20): 
    














r
V
u
V
u
V
r
V
n
V 31312 . 
From equation (18), Kf
n
V ''''2  

 .  With 0'' f  and 0'' , 02 


n
V .  Since 
01 


r
V , 01 


u
V , 03 


u
V , and 03 


r
V , we have 0 .  With   nonsingular, a unique 
equilibrium exists.8   
In macroeconomics, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and 
the unemployment rate.  In the Lewis model in economic development, it is assumed that capital 
accumulation leads to an increase in the level of employment in the manufacturing sector.  The 
Lewis model has been criticized because capital accumulation may lead to the adoption of 
technologies saving labor while employment in the manufacturing sector may not increase.  The 
following proposition studies whether an increase in the amount of capital leads to a decrease in 
the unemployment rate.   
 
                                                 
8 Turnovsky (1977, chap. 2) discusses conditions for the existence of a unique local equilibrium and a unique global 
equilibrium.  He demonstrates that conditions for the existence of a unique global equilibrium are very strict.  Thus 
we focus on the existence of a unique local equilibrium. 
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Proposition 1: An increase in the amount of capital leads firms to choose more advanced 
technologies and the wage rate increases.  The impact on the interest rate and the unemployment 
rate is ambiguous.9 
Proof: Plugging the value of m  from equation (12) into equation (8) yields 
   



 
K
fw 11

.           (21) 
An application of envelope theorem on equation (21) leads to 
   0


K
w
dK
dw . 
An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (20) reveals 
   













 /31312
u
V
r
V
r
V
u
V
K
V
dK
dn , 
   





















 /321321321
u
V
n
V
K
V
n
V
K
V
u
V
K
V
n
V
u
V
dK
dr , 
   





















 /321321321
K
V
n
V
r
V
n
V
K
V
r
V
r
V
n
V
K
V
dK
du . 
Since 02 


K
V  and 03131 








u
V
r
V
r
V
u
V , 0
dK
dn .  Since the sign of 
u
V
n
V
K
V
n
V
K
V
u
V
K
V
n
V
u
V

















 321321321  is undetermined, the sign of 
dK
dr  undetermined.  Since 
the sign of 
K
V
n
V
r
V
n
V
K
V
r
V
r
V
n
V
K
V

















 321321321  is undetermined, the sign of 
dK
du  is 
undetermined. 
 
From Proposition 1, the wage rate increases with the amount of capital.  Since the price of 
the consumption good is normalized to one, an increase in the wage rate is an increase in both 
nominal and real wage rates.  To understand Proposition 1, when the amount of capital increases, 
the number of firms may be either constant or increase.  First, if the number of firms is constant, 
each firm uses more capital and the productivity of labor increases.  As a result, the wage rate 
                                                 
9 In a model with constant returns to scale in the production of the consumption good, an increase in the amount of 
capital can decrease the interest rate.  With increasing returns in this model, the interest rate may not decrease when 
the amount of capital increases. 
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increases.  Second, if the equilibrium number of firms increases, an increase in the number of firms 
increases the degree of competition in the labor market and the wage rate increases.   
From Proposition 1, a higher amount of capital leads firms to choose more advanced 
technologies.  However, the impact on the unemployment rate is ambiguous.10  The intuition 
behind this result is as follows.  When the amount of capital increases, there are two effects.  First, 
since a firm chooses a more advanced technology, the amount of labor required to produce each 
unit of output decreases.  This tends to decrease the demand for labor.  Second, an increase in the 
amount of capital increases one factor of production and total output in this economy increases.  
An increase in output increases the demand for labor.  Since the two effects work in opposite 
directions, overall the total impact on the demand for labor and thus on the unemployment rate is 
ambiguous.   
In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the impact of an increase in the amount of capital on the 
unemployment rate is not studied explicitly.  However, if we view that an increase in the amount 
of capital increases the marginal product of a worker, an increase in the amount of capital will 
decrease the unemployment rate in their model.  The reason for this difference between their result 
and the result here is that the choice of technology is not incorporated in their model.  With the 
presence of the second effect (an increase in a factor of production) only, an increase in the amount 
of capital always decreases unemployment rate in their model.   
The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the exogenous job separation 
rate. 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the exogenous job separation rate increases the 
unemployment rate and decreases the interest rate, but changes neither the equilibrium technology 
nor the wage rate. 
Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (20) leads to 
    0
db
dn , 
    0/321 






r
V
n
V
b
V
db
du , 
                                                 
10 In this model, when the amount of capital increases, the impact on the interest rate is ambiguous. 
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    0/321 






u
V
n
V
b
V
db
dr . 
From equation (21), since 0
db
dn , 0
db
dw . 
 
To understand the result that an increase in the exogenous job separation rate does not 
affect the equilibrium technology in this model, from equation (18), the equilibrium technology 
depends on the amount of capital only.  The intuition behind this observation is as follows.  
Equation (9) is the condition for a firm’s optimal choice of technology.  In this equation, a firm’s 
technology is affected by the wage rate, the interest rate, and its level of output.  However, the 
wage rate, the interest rate, and the level of output are endogenously determined in the model.  
When there is an increase in the interest rate, the level of output of a firm also increases, and the 
impact from an increase in the interest rate is cancelled out by that from an increase in output.  
Thus the remaining variable affecting the equilibrium technology is the wage rate.  From equation 
(21), the wage rate is determined by the amount of capital.  As a result, in equilibrium, the 
equilibrium technology is affected by the amount of capital only. 
This result is different from that in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in which an increase in the 
exogenous job separation rate (later the cost of exerting effort) increases the equilibrium wage rate.  
This difference can be understood as follows.  The adjustment mechanisms for the nonshirking 
condition to hold are different in the two models.  In their model, the interest rate is exogenously 
given.  When the exogenous job separation rate (or the cost of exerting effort) increases, both the 
wage rate and the unemployment rate increase so that the nonshirking condition is satisfied.  In 
this model, since the interest rate is endogenously determined, the adjustment of the interest rate 
provides an additional channel for the nonshirking condition to be satisfied.  When the exogenous 
job separation rate (or the cost of exerting effort) increases, the interest rate decreases and the 
unemployment rate increases so that the nonshirking condition is satisfied. 
In Proposition 2, the interest rate decreases when the exogenous job separation rate 
increases.  How to understand this result?  From equations (8), (12), and (14), a firm’s output can 
be expressed as rKrfm
w
rfx 


1
.  With rKx  , since the amount of capital is fixed, the 
interest rate is directly related to the level of output of a firm.  Intuitively, when the interest rate 
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increases, a firm needs to produce a higher level of output to break even.  An alternative 
interpretation is that a firm can afford a higher level of interest rate payment when its output 
increases.  With the interest rate increases with the level of output, factors leading to an increase 
in the level of output will lead to an increase in the interest rate.  When the exogenous job 
separation rate increases, through the nonshirking condition, the wage rate increases.  Other things 
equal, an increase in the wage rate increases a firm’s marginal cost and output decreases.  Thus, 
the interest rate decreases.  This explanation can also be used to explain results shown later.  First, 
an increase in population increases the interest rate because an increase in population increases the 
output of a firm.  Second, an increase in the cost of exerting effort decreases the interest rate 
because an increase in the cost of exerting effort decreases the level of output through the 
nonshirking condition.  Third, an increase in the probability that shirking is detected increases the 
interest rate because an increase in the probability that shirking is detected decreases the wage rate 
through the nonshirking condition and output increases. 
When there is an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, since the amount of capital 
and the level of technology do not change, the equilibrium wage rate does not change.  Since the 
equilibrium technology does not change, from equation (12), the equilibrium number of firms does 
not change.  However, since the equilibrium interest rate decreases, each firm produces a lower 
level of output.   
An increase in population increases the supply of labor.  The following proposition studies 
whether this will decrease the wage rate. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in population increases the unemployment rate and the interest 
rate, but changes neither the equilibrium technology nor the equilibrium wage rate. 
Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (20) leads to 
    0
dL
dn , 
    0/321 






L
V
n
V
r
V
dL
du , 
    0/321 






L
V
n
V
u
V
dL
dr . 
From equation (21), since 0
dL
dn , 0
dL
dw . 
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As discussed in the paragraph after Proposition 2, even though the wage rate is 
endogenously determined in this model and is subject to change, in equilibrium the wage rate does 
not decrease when the size of the population increases.   
The impact of an increase in population on other variables can also be studied.  First, since 
the unemployment rate increases and the equilibrium wage rate does not change, the expected 
labor income of a worker decreases.11  Since both the expected labor income and the return from 
capital decrease, an individual is worse off when there is an increase in population.  Second, when 
there is an increase in population, since the amount of capital and the equilibrium technology do 
not change, the equilibrium number of firms does not change.  Third, since the equilibrium interest 
rate increases, from equation (9), each firm produces a higher level of output.  Finally, from 
equation (11), since the number of firms and technology do not change and the level of output 
increases, the number of individuals employed increases with the size of the population.  The 
unemployment rate increases because the rate of the increase in the number of individuals 
employed is smaller than the rate of the increase in population. 
If the cost of exerting effort increases, the marginal cost of supplying labor is higher.  The 
following proposition studies whether an increase in the cost of exerting effort increases the 
equilibrium wage rate. 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in the cost of exerting effort increases the unemployment rate 
and decreases the interest rate, but changes neither the equilibrium technology nor the equilibrium 
wage rate. 
Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (20) leads to 
    0
de
dn , 
    0/321 






r
V
n
V
e
V
de
du , 
    0/321 






u
V
n
V
e
V
de
dr . 
                                                 
11 The result that an increase in population leads to an increase in the unemployment rate is similar to that in Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984).  In their model, an increase in population also increases the unemployment rate.   
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From equation (21), since 0
de
dn , 0
de
dw . 
 
As discussed in the paragraph after Proposition 2, since the equilibrium technology does 
not change, the equilibrium wage rate does not change even though the cost of exerting effort 
increases.  Since both the expected labor income and the return from capital decrease and the cost 
of exerting effort increases, an individual is worse off when there is an increase in the cost of effort.   
The probability that shirking is detected is related to the level of efficiency in the labor 
market.  The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the probability that shirking 
is detected. 
 
Proposition 5: An increase in the probability that shirking is detected leads to a decrease in 
the unemployment rate and an increase in the interest rate, but changes neither the equilibrium 
technology nor the equilibrium wage rate. 
Proof: An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (20) leads to 
    0
dq
dn , 
    0/321 






r
V
n
V
q
V
dq
du , 
    0/321 






u
V
n
V
q
V
dq
dr . 
From equation (21), since 0
dq
dn , 0
dq
dw . 
 
 The equilibrium wage rate does not change when there is an increase in the probability that 
shirking is detected.  Since both the expected labor income and the return from capital increase, 
an individual is better off rather than worse off when there is an increase in the probability that 
shirking is detected.   
The impact of an increase in the probability that shirking is detected on other variables can 
also be studied.  First, the equilibrium number of firms does not change because the amount of 
 17 
 
capital and the equilibrium technology do not change.  Second, since the interest rate increases, 
from equation (9), each firm produces a higher level of output.   
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that by incorporating the choice of technology into the 
Shapiro-Stiglitz model, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage 
adjustment, we are able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market in a unified 
model.  First, an increase in capital leads firms to choose more advanced technologies and the 
equilibrium wage rate increases.  However, the impact on the unemployment rate is ambiguous.  
Second, an increase in the level of exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, or the 
cost of exerting effort leads to an increase in the unemployment rate and a decrease in the interest 
rate, but changes neither the equilibrium level of technology nor the wage rate.  An individual is 
worse off when there is an increase in population.  Third, an increase in the probability that shirking 
is detected increases the employment rate and the interest rate, but neither changes the equilibrium 
technology nor the wage rate.  An individual is better off rather than worse off when there is an 
increase in the probability that shirking is detected. 
 
Appendix: A closed form solution to equations (17)-(19) 
 In this Appendix, by specifying functional forms for the marginal and fixed costs of 
production, we can solve equations (17)-(19) explicitly.  We specify  
nnf )( ,          (A1) 
n
n 1)(  .          (A2) 
 Plugging (A1) and (A2) into equation (18) yields the level of technology 
     
2
Kn  .          (A3) 
 Plugging (A1), (A2), and (A3) into equation (19) yields the interest rate 
     Lur
4
1 .          (A4) 
 Plugging (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4) into equation (17) yields the following equation 
defining the unemployment rate implicitly 
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    0442 



  buq
e
KqLLu .        (A5) 
 From (A5), 
e
KqqLLu
uu
u
L
dL
du




42
)1(
/
/ .  If 042 
e
KqqLLu , or 
L
q
e
KqL
u
2
4
 , then 0
dL
du . 
 Equation (A5) has two roots.  One root is 
L
Lbq
e
KqLq
e
KqL
u
2
1644
2




 
 .  
This root indicates a negative unemployment rate and is thus discarded.  The other root is kept: 
   
L
Lbq
e
KqLq
e
KqL
u
2
1644
2




 
 .       (A6) 
 From (A6), it is clear that 
L
q
e
KqL
u
2
4
 .  Thus 0
dL
du . 
 Plugging (A6) into (A4) yields 
   Lbq
e
KqLq
e
KqLr 164
8
1
288
2




  .       (A7) 
 From (A7), 0
dL
dr  if b
e
Kq 44 



  .  The validity of this inequality can be checked by 
(A6) when we require that the unemployment rate should not be larger than one. 
 Equations (A3), (A6), and (A7) provide a set of solutions for the system of equations (17)-
(19).  With the values of u , r , and n  determined, the values of other variables can also be 
determined.  For example, plugging equations (A1) and (A3) into equation (12) yields the 
equilibrium number of firms 
     2m . 
Plugging (A1), (A2), and (A3) into equation (21) yields the equilibrium wage rate 
     
4
Kw  .          (A8) 
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 Plugging (A1), (A2), (A3), (A7), and (A8) into equation (14) yields the equilibrium level 
of output of a firm 
    











  Lbq
e
KqLq
e
KqLKx 164
8
1
288
2
.   
 
Acknowledgements: I thank Kevin X. D. Huang and anonymous referees for their insightful 
suggestions.  I am solely responsible for all remaining errors. 
 
References 
 
Abowd, John, Francis Kramarz, and David Margolis. 1999. High wage workers and high wage 
firms. Econometrica 67, 251-333. 
 
Brander, James. 1995. “Strategic Trade Policy,” in Gene Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (Eds.), 
Handbook of International Economics. Volume 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1395-1455. 
 
Chandler, Alfred. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Davis, Donald, and James Harrigan. 2011. Good jobs, bad jobs, and trade liberalization. Journal 
of International Economics 84, 26-36.  
 
Dickens, William, and Lawrence Katz. 1987. Interindustry wage differences and industry 
characteristics. In Kevin Lang and Jonathan Leonard, Unemployment and the Structure of Labor 
Markets, Oxford: Basic Blackwell. 
 
Dickens, William, Lorenz Goette, Erica Groshen, Steinar Holden, Julian Messina, Mark 
Schweitzer, Jarkko Turunen, and Melanie Ward. 2007. How wages change: micro evidence from 
the international wage flexibility project. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 195-214. 
 
 20 
 
Fella, Giulio. 2000. Efficiency wage and efficient redundancy pay. European Economic Review 
44, 1473-1490. 
 
Gottschalk, Peter. 2005. Downward nominal-wage flexibility: real or measurement error. Review 
of Economics and Statistics 87, 556-568. 
 
Hall, Robert. 2005. Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. American 
Economic Review 95, 50-65. 
 
Hoon, Hian Teck. 2001. Adjustment of wages and equilibrium unemployment in a Ricardian 
global economy. Journal of International Economics 54, 193-209. 
 
Kimball, Miles. 1994. Labor-market dynamics when unemployment is a worker discipline device. 
American Economic Review 84, 1045-1059. 
 
Levinson, Marc. 2006. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mankiw, N. Greogry, and Michael Whinston. 1986. Free entry and social inefficiency. Rand 
Journal of Economics 17, 48-58. 
 
Matusz, Steven. 1996. International trade, the division of labor, and unemployment. International 
Economic Review 37, 71-84.  
 
Porter, Michael. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, NY: Free Press. 
 
Prendergast, Renee. 1990. Scale of production and choice of technique in the engineering 
industries in developing countries. Journal of Development Studies 27, 72-88. 
 
Romer, David. 2005. Advanced Macroeconomics. 3rd edition, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
 21 
 
Rudanko, Leena. 2011. Aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in a frictional labor market. American 
Economic Review 101, 2823-43. 
 
Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie, and Martin Uribe. 2013. Downward nominal wage rigidities and the 
case for temporary inflation in the Eurozone. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3), 193-212. 
 
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1984. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. 
American Economic Review 74, 433-444. 
 
Todaro, Michael, and Stephen Smith. 2012. Economic Development. 11th edition, Boston, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
 
Turnovsky, Stephen. 1977. Macroeconomic Analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Zhang, Junxi. 2007. Endogenous markups, intensity of competition, and persistence of business 
cycles. Southern Economic Journal 74, 546-565. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2004. The division of labor and the extent of the market. Economic Theory 24, 
195-209. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2009. Population growth and industrialization. Economic Inquiry 47, 247-265. 
 
Zhou, Haiwen. 2013. The choice of technology and rural-urban migration in economic 
development. Frontiers of Economics in China 8, 337-361. 
